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A husband and wife prepare for a divorce trial and appear to Court. The
Court advises them that they can either save money by stipulating to issues or fight
them out in trial, suggesting that the attorneys may receive all of the portions of the
couple's estate. He states, "My hands are pretty well tied." Thus, the parties agree to
attempt a stipulation and adjourn in chambers. While in chambers, me Court is
apprised that the wife is disabled and receives social security. The husband still earned
a living as a postal employee. The Court declines that the wife is entitled to an award
of child support based upon her receipt of social security. The Court is plainly in error

on the law regarding this issue. The wife would not be entitled to an award of child
support if the husband, or obligor, was on SSI, not when the custodial parent, or in this
case, the wife receives social security from her past social security contribution.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3
(1997) (2)(h) (appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including,
but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support,
visitation, adoption, and paternity). The appellant (hereinafter "the Husband")
appealed, but later withdrew his appeal pursuant to Rule 37, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Also, the Cross-Appellant (hereinafter "the Wife") appealed because the
Court has erroneously deprived the Wife of child support contrary to Utah Law,
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-1, etseq.1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
(1) Whether the Wife, as the custodial parent is entitled to an award of
child support as the custodial parent, and that the Court committed plain error by
interpreting Section 78-45-7.5(8)(a) against her amounting to an abuse of discretion?
In divorce proceedings, including initial custody awards, we give trial courts
broad discretion. E.g., Moody v. Moody, 715 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 1985). So
long as that discretion is exercised within the confines of the legal standards we
have set, Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074, (Utah 1985), and the facts and
reasons for the decision are set forth fully in appropriate findings and
conclusions, Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986), we will not disturb
> Specifically Section 78-45-7.5(8)(b) (1997).
2

the resulting award. We review the findings made by a judge sitting without a
jury under the "clearly erroneous" standard of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a). Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 149-50 n.l (Utah 1987); see Utah R.
Civ. P. 52(a).
Davis v. Davis, 7,.|i) y M i,.|7 illuili 1988).
(2)

Whether the Court erred by awarding attorney's fees to the

Husband when she successfully objected to form and content of the proposed Decree of
Divorce,

.

the Bell Test?

Section 30-3-3 of the Utah Code "grants trial courts the power to award
-ney
fees in divorce cases" but the award "must be based on evidence of the
reasonableness of the requested fees, as well as the financial need of the
receiving spouse." Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Still, the decision whether or not to award attorney fees is within the sound
discretion of the trial court, see id., and we review a trial court's denial of fees
under an abuse of discretion standard; see Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305,
1310 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Taylor v. Hansen, 342 Utah Adv. Rpt. 41 (Supreme Court, May 7, 1998).
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
• • ).

Utah Code Ann. 8 78-45 7 .> (1997).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case:
This case arises from the mutual divorce awarded to the Wife and

the disabled wife and custodial parent of child support from the employed husband and
obligor. Trial was discouraged by the Court and the Court was clear that child support

would not be awarded.
//.

Course of the Proceedings:
This case went through several pre-trial motions where at one point Judge

L. A. Dever set temporary child support at "$364.50 pursuant to the child support
guidelines." (R. at 70). The temporary order was "calculated based upon [the
Husband]'s income $3,212 and [the Wife]'s income of $1,0462. . . ." Subsequendy at
trial, Judge John A. Rokich declined to award any child support. This failure was
plainly in error. But when faced with the alternative of going to trial that she may owe
more to her attorney, she was compelled to proceed forward with the settlement
process. That day the parties entered into an oral stipulation, then both parties
appealed for various reasons arguably because neitfier were happy with the stipulation
they felt was forced upon them.
///.

Disposition in Trial Court:
Judge John A. Rokich accepted on the record the oral stipulation and

awarded both parties a mutual divorce from the other.
IV.

Statement of Facts:
On or about August 12, 1996, the Husband filed for divorce from the

Wife, (r. at 7), and the Wife counterclaimed. (R. at 19). In these pleadings, both
parties asked for child support to be assessed. Contemporaneously, on Augst 30, 1996,
2

This amount represents the SSI the Wife receives from social security benefits
due to her earnings alone.
4

the Wife filed Impecuniously due to her disability and limited income. With the
Affidavit of Impecunious, the Wife also filed for temporary support, including a request
ition reporting and combined social
security and disability income of $683. (R. at 26).
On or about October 28, 1996, at the temporary hearing, Judge L.A.
Dever appropriately awarded child support to the Wife, (R at 56). Said child support
was established! ill H$364 Mil puisuanl In (lie child suppoil
temporary order was "calculated based upon [the Husband]'s income $3,212 and [the
Wife]'s income of $1,0463

"

Going into mm mi uie otiici nana, Judge Rokich incorrectly entered
findings that no child support would be awarded. The '
was disabled and receiving SSI, (TT. at 8), and die Court responded with, "I know
that

Immediately after a couple more exchanges, the Court stated, "I probably

'Imiild li.nr had you ronir mln f liainhcrs and we could din uss this ,ii)d sec it I can t
get these issues resolved." (TT. at 8-9). Thus they re-adjoumed in chambers.
The parties then commenced talking about property distribution, which
included a inanlal home and three rental properties. The Husband's counsel proposed a
mere $300 a month in alimony. (TT. at 10). Ilie Wife objected, restating that w1leii
you take into consideration her SSI and so forth. Counsel added, "But she has had to
3

This amount represents (In11 S S I Hm
i Wilr receive, tioni social secui il\ kncTits
due to her earnings alone.
5

borrow a substantial amount of money during the pendency of this action." (TT. at 1011). The Court responded, "I don't doubt that. What about the child, though?"
Counsel advised him that the Wife believes that ultimately the Court would find that the
Husband actually earns "$3,016 as his final income." (TT. at 11).
The parties went on to discuss loans the Wife received from her father
and the Court stated, "I don't believe that" apparently believing that the money from
her father may not necesssarily be gifted her her. The Court went on, "I think the
alimony, well, the alimony award, I don;t see any way out of it. Divide the property
and alimony at $300 a month may not be enough, What about the child? If is because
of her she is getting the --" (TT. at 12). The Court was cut off by the Wife's attorney
who attempted to clarify, "That's correct. Stuff he has to sign." Substantially
confused, the Court stated, "So he is alleviated that obligation evidently by getting the
social security and paying for the child. So he has got to pay more than (inaudible). I
will equalize it out. Her total income would be about equal to what he has got. And
they both share the debts equally and divode the property up equally."
Counsel for the Husband then asked, "So what is the Court's suggestion if
we do divide it equally, how much are we looking at?" The Court answered, "Well, it
depends on--if he has got~if she has got a $1073 now and what's his net after taxes,
what is his taxes.4
4

Apparendy the court was confused as he was taking the Wife's SSI and disability
into account as an income and child support obligation. The Wife believes that the court
6

The parties went on discussing various matters but all concerning
alimony, which included the reciting of the figures from the Husband s Fimmiiat
De(ItiraiiiHL Saidl fii'inr aiyucil In the Wife's attorney was "$3,212" when
considering the Husband's extra income of $200. (TT. at 15). Thus the court found
that the Husband was taking home $2,804. (TT, a* 1/;>i And ultimately the court
calculated a I'indin^ ui'$11 <>u0 of ,iu una
(T

.ius concluded an award of alimony at $600 to the Wife.
Upon this conclusion, Ms. Lems, counsel for the Husband asked, "Is that

in addition to the child support?" The court, still apparently confused responded,
"She' s not paying <UJ> dnhl ;«,yp(MH( da anse—she only IV-I v mc--hnu much are you
getting in child support, $1,073; right?" The Wife exclaimed, "That's my social
security money. That's not child support." The court then asked, I thought I saw in
here that you were getting so much per month loi a iliillil

"Viiill I he W ite ivphcd,

"$386 because 1 ,tm disabled." "So you are getting this $386 for child for—said the
court and the Wife finished with, "I get $1,073 total." So with that, the court
reiterated, "That's what I said, $1,073. So, if he pays about $600 that makes you
about equal,
support or alimony, I don't know. (Inaudible) the child is getting that income. (TT. at
17).
was apparently replacing the disability payment to the child that the Wife had paid into
thus relieving the Husband of any child support obligation.
7

Ms. Lems apparentiy knew as well that the court was mistaken as she
asked again, "So, are you suggesting, Your Honor, just to make sure that I am clear,
that we would divide the properties in half and that he would pay $600 a month then in
alimony . . . . and there would be no additional sums owing on child support . . . since
she does get dependent disability income for the child." The court agreed. (TT. at 18).
Then the Wife's attorney attempted to elaborate that this still would not equalize the
disparity in the couple's incomes as there would be a difference of approximately
$300.5 The court responded to arguments, "Just divide everything equally. The only
thing I can do is divide it all equally. She pays - - well, get to that now. She'l pay her
fees and he'll pay his fees and if we are going to divide it up equal, they are going to
pay all the debts, split the debts, each pay their own fees and costs."6 At any rate, the
mediation continued.
Then while the parties later addressed other child maintenance issues,
particularly the health insurance premium through the Husband's employment. The
Husband objected to having to pay the full $18 monthly payment. So the court wanted
to split it. The Wife's attorney responded, " But he's not paying any child support."
And the court agreed. Counsel went on, "So, I think that that should just be awash at

5

$300 is nearly the same amount of the prior Judge Dever temporary child support
award of $364.50. (TT. at 70).
6

This response appears to be equally confused as it does not actually apply to the
arguments.
8

minimum. I mean, he is not paying anything in child support. He is getting benefits."
The court ignored the attempt keeping the amount split and asked them to get out their
calculators. (TT. at 22).
The parties continued to show dissatisfaction, thus the court declared,
Let me tell you what I think. One thing. Now, you can be hear and you can go
to trial, you will spend more money on attorney's fees than what you are
fighting about. So be reasonable. In order to get these things resolved, you
have to be reasonable. It's not a life and death matter. You know, I don't know
why people — what price you put on peace of mind. Is it wourthfightingone
another over a piece of furniture or over a $500 camper? Is it worth it?
Like I have seen here, I just had a case here not too long ago, the people
wound up owing the attorneys more than their estate was worth. So, if you want
to do that, fine. I can take the bench and (inaudible). My hands are pretty well
tied. I have some discretion, but I am going to divide everting equally, but,
gees, if you are going to be fighting about a camper or some furniture, then
(inaudible) pretty well assured of getting your alimony regularly, unless they fire
him, that's highly unlikely as a postal worker, so look at the pluses. I have so
many come in that are awarded alimony that never get paid. So, just have a
litde give and take and I think you can get this worked out.7
(TT. at 26). With that counsel for the Husband concurred and the court recessed while
the Wife and her counsel discussed their options. It was clear though no matter what,
the court would not entertain die child support issue.
Thereafter, the parties entered into an oral stipulation which was read into
the record. (TT. at 27). In the record, the provision regarding child support read,
"The amount that the defendant is receiving for the minor child on the disability income

7

The court's admonishment was inaccurate as the judge is a divorce proceeding has
broad discression and his hands really are not so tied up. Nonetheless, the admonishment
was clear to the Wife that she would have to appeal to get anywhere with the child support
issue.
9

will substitute as any type of child support. Therefore, there will be no order of child
support that [the Husband] has to pay [the Wife]. (TT. at 28).
Thereafter, the counsel for the Wife, added, "If I can have one moment?
There is a couple of clarifications, Your Honor, for me. First off, in regards to the
child support, the order should read something to the effect that so long as - -" The
court cut him off stating, "As the government is paying for it, social security?" Mr.
Oliver agreed and attempted to explain just to be cut-off again, "Otherwise - -" , by the
court, "Well, I don't want to get in trouble. I was going to call that to your attention
anyhow." (TT. at 33). Thereafter, once the stipulation was completed, both parties
answered "Yes" when asked if they agreed to the stipulation. (TT. at 34). However,
both parties immediately appealed once, the decree was entered.
Meanwhile, the Husband's counsel agreed to prepare the proposed final
pleadings. (TT. at 38). But the initial set was not acceptable and the Wife objected.
(R. at 211-215). The court approved sustained some of the objections, but overturned
others. Nonetheless, and in spite of the Wife disability and indigency, the court
awarded the Husband attorney's fees of $400. (R. at 261).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The court's refusal to award the Wife child support is contrary to Section
78-45-7.5 (1997) and based upon his clearly erroneous understanding of the social
security and disability benefit received by the Wife. Section 78-45-7.5 substitutes the

10

social security benefit in lieu of child support when the obligor is the party receiving
the social security benefit not the custodial parent.
Moreover, it was well established that the Wife is disabled and on a fixed
income. The Wife filed as an indigent litigant while the Husband received incme which
clearly exceeded the Wife. Nevertheless, the court awarded the Husband attorney's
fees of $400 for having to defend the Wife's objections which some were meritorious,
but all were brought or asserted in good faith. The award was unreasonable as it was
contrary to the Bell Test and Section 30-3-3.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
THE DENIAL OF CHILD SUPPORT WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
The Wife urges this court to rule that the judge's findings of her social
security and disability income $1,073 does not preclude the Husband from a child
support obligation. The relevant statutory provision at issue is Section 78-45-7.5.
Subsection 78-45-7.5(8)(b) reads, inter alia:
Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a parent shall
be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning record it is based,
by crediting the amount against the potential obligation of the parent.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (1997).
The appellate courts have outlined the criteria upon which a party may
successful rely on the plain error doctrine. To establish plain error, the party must
show that: "(i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial

ii

court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
An error is harmful if, "absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome" for the defendant, or "our confidence in the verdict is
undermined." Id. at 1208-09.
In this matter, the issue of child support meets the test outlined in Dunn.
First, the failure to set child support is clear error as child support is mandated for all
persons who are noncustodial parents as proscribed by the Uniform Civil Liability for
Support Act. Second, this error should have been obvious to the trial judge. As a
matter of fact, both attorneys kept asking for clarification about the child support issue.
It was clear in the record as identified above, that once the alimony issue had been
discussed and the court ordered that $600 would be appropriate, thereafter the
Husband's attorney asked if that would be in addition to child support, and again. (TT.
at 17-18). Finally, it is equally clear that the Wife has been, is, and shall continue to
be harmed by this decision. The intent of child support is to assist her in maintaining a
roof over the child's head. This obligation is both parents to maintain. In reading
Subsection 78-45-7.5(8)(b), no where does it alleviate the Husband from his child
support obligation. That subsection provides that the Wife is receiving Social Security
benefits is credited towards her income as her income. No part of the benefits received
by the Wife is attributed to the Husband's income to alleviate or obviate his child
support obligation. In this matter, there remains an addition $300 between the parties'

12

incomes that remain disparate between the Husband's income and the Wife's benefits
and alimony that can be applied in this matter towards the child support obligation.
The $600 alimony without child support is insufficient for the Wife and the parties'
daughter. Child support should awarded in addition to alimony.
POINT II.
THE $400 AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IS UNREASONABLE UNDER THE
EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES.
The Bell Court established a procedure and a test for determining the
award of attorney's fees by the trial court. The test established consists of a three
prong analysis. The first of the three prongs involves an examination of the need of the
spouse who is requesting the payment of attorney's fees. The second prong involves an
analysis of the spouse who may be required to pay the attorney's fees. The final prong
deals with the reasonableness of the amount of the fees (see Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489
(UtahApp. 1991).
The Bell Court stated:
To permit meaningful review of the trial court's discretionary ruling, "we have
consistently encouraged trial courts to makefindingsto explain the factors which
they considered relevant in arriving at an attorney fee award." Regional Sales
Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also
Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 518 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (for meaningful
appellate review trial court must explain factors and basis for sua sponte
reduction of attorney fees); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) (award of attorney fees in divorce case remanded for more adequate
findings). In Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah Ct. App. 1990),
we held it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award less than the
claimed amount of attorney fees without any reasonable justification, and that a
trial court must explain its sua sponte reduction in order to permit meaningful
13

review on appeal. See also Regional Sales Agency, Inc., 784 P.2d at 1215
(findings particularly important when the trial court has reduced the attorney fees
from the amount requested, and amount requested was supported by undisputed
evidence); Martindale, 777 P.2d at 518.
Id. In this matter the award of attorney's fees did not follow any Bell Test. The court
entered the amount of $400~apparently an arbitrary amount. The main point to
consider is that the the Bell Test is very similar to the Jones Factors. For all practical
purposes, the same factors, or prongs, are considered in assessing attorney's fees as
they are in determining alimony. In this matter, alimony was awarded to the Wife.
Contrary to that award, the court imposed attorney's fees against the Wife even though
she was partially meritorious with her objections toward the proposed final documents.
It appeared to the Wife, that perhaps the trial judge became confused as to who
objected and who prevailed on the objections. Perhaps the judge figured that the $400
were to be awarded to the Wife and not vice versa.
CONCLUSION
The trial court clearly and prejudicially committed reversible error in
declining to award the Wife child support and by assessing attorney's fees against her.
Hence, this Honorable Court should vacate the order and reverse the trial court's
decision as to these awards and remand them for determination. Moreover, the Wife
respectfully requests that this Court mandate that the child support may be applied
retroactively to the date of the entry of the Decree of Divorce.

14

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of
January, 1999.

^A,

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Respondent and Cross-Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 3j& day of January,
1999,1 served a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT, postage
prepaid, to: Wendy J. Lems, LARSEN & MOONEY LAW, 50 West Broadway, First
Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.

D. BRUCE OLIVER
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HUSBAND AND WIFE

Section

Family Court Act —Purpose*,
Appointment of counsel for child.
30-3-11.2.
Mandatory educational course for divorcing
30-3-11.3.
parents — Purpose — Curriculum — Exceptions.
Courts to exercise family counseling powers.
30-3-12.
30-3-13.
Repealed.
Establishment of family court division of dis30-3-13.1.
trict court.
Repealed.
30-3-14.
Designation of judges — Terms.
30-3-14.1.
Repealed.
30-3-15.
Appointment of domestic relations counselors,
30-3-15.1.
family court commissioner, and assistants
and clerks.
Repealed.
30-3-15.2.
Commissioners — Powers.
30-3-15.3.
30-3-15.4.
Salaries and expenses.
Repealed.
30-3-16.
30-3-16.1.
Jurisdiction of family court division — Powers.
30-3-16.2.
Petition for conciliation.
30-3-16.3.
Contents of petition.
30-3-16.4.
Procedure upon filing of petition.
30-3-16.5.
Fees.
30-3-16.6.
Information not available to public.
30-3-16,7,
Effect ofjoetition — Pendency of action.
30-3-17.
Power and jurisdiction of judge.
30-3-17.1.
Proceedings deemed confidential — Written
evaluation by counselor.
30-3-18.
Waiting period for hearing after filing for. divorce — Exemption — Use of counseling and
education services not to be construed as
condonation or promotion.
30-3-19 to 30-3-31. Repealed.
30-3-32.
Visitation — Intent — Policy — Definitions.
30-3-33.
Advisory guidelines.
30-3-34.
Best interests — Rebuttable presumption.
30-3-35.
Minimum schedule for visitation for children 5
to 18 years of age.
30-3-35.5.
Minimum schedule for visitation for children
under five years of age.
30-3-36.
Special circumstances.
30-3-37.
Relocation.
30-3-38.
Pilot Program for Expedited Visitation Enforcement.
30-3-1. Procedure — Residence — Grounds.
(1) Proceedings in divorce are commenced and conducted as
provided by law for proceedings in civil causes, except as
provided in this chapter.
(2) The court may decree a dissolution of the marriage
contract between the petitioner and respondent on the
grounds specified in Subsection (3) in all cases where the
petitioner or respondent has been an actual and bona fide
resident of this state and of the county where the action is
brought, or if members of the armed forces of the United
States who are not legal residents of this state, where the
petitioner has been stationed in this state under military
orders, for three months next prior to the commencement of
the action.
(3) Grounds for divorce:
(a) impotency of the respondent at the time of marriage;
(b) adultery committed by the respondent subsequent
to marriage; —*
(c) willful desertion of the petitioner by the respondent
for more than one year;

30-3-3

(d) willful neglect of the respondent to provide for the
petitioner the common necessaries of life;
(e) habitual drunkenness of the respondent;
(f) conviction of the respondent for a felony,
(g) cruel treatment of the petitioner by the respondent
to the extent of causing bodily injury or great mental
distress to the petitioner;
(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage;
(i) incurable insanity, or
(j) when the husband and wife have lived separately
under a decree of separate maintenance of any state for
three consecutive years without cohabitation.
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection (3Xj) does
not affect the liability of either party under any provision for
separate maintenance previously granted.
(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the grounds of
insanity unless:
(i) the respondent has been adjudged insane by the
appropriate authorities of this or another state prior
to the commencement of the action; and
(ii) the court finds by the testimony of competent
witnesses that the insanity of the respondent is
incurable,
(b) The court shall appoint for the respondent a guardian ad litem who shall protect the interests of the respondent A copy of the summons and complaint shall be
served on the respondent in person or by publication, as
provided by the laws of this state in other actions for
divorce, or upon his guardian ad litem, and upon the
county attorney for the county where the action is prosecuted.
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the merits of
the case and if the respondent resides out of this state,
take depositions as necessary, attend the proceedings, and
make a defense as is just to protect the rights of the
respondent and the interests of the state.
(d) In all actions the court and judge have jurisdiction
over the payment of alimony, the distribution of property,
and the custody and maintenance of minor children, as
the courts and judges possess in other actions for divorce.
(e) The petitioner or respondent may, if the respondent
resides in this state, upon notice, have the respondent
brought into the court at trial, or have an examination of
the respondent by two or more competent physicians, to
determine the mental condition of the respondent. For
this purpose either party may have leavefromthe court to
enter any asylum or institution where the respondent
may be confined. The costs of court in this action shall be
apportioned by the court.
1997
30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce.
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorcefromhis wife
for the same causes and in the same manner as the wife may
obtain a divorce from her husband.
2953
30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees —
Temporary alimony.
(1) In any actionfiledunder Title 30, Chapter 3,4, or 6, and
in any action to establish an order of custody, visitation, child
support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case,
the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and
witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party
to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The
order may include provision for costs of the action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation,
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic
case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the
claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no
fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party
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is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not
awarding fees.
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may
order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the
action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other
party and of any children in the custody of the other party.
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(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding
the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders;
and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the
with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
final order or judgment may be amended during the course of
(2) The court may include, in an order deterrnining child
t h e action or in the final order or judgment.
1993
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a
30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Use of affi- portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or traindavit — Sealing.
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the ing of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent chilpetitioner or petitioner's attorney.
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an order
or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken in Ihe allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the
cause. If the decree is to be entered upon the default of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or trainrespondent, evidence to support the decree may be sub- ing of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsemitted upon the affidavit of the petitioner with the apquent changes or new orders for the custody of the children
proval of the court.
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and
(c) If the petitioner and the respondent have a child or for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is
children, a decree of divorce may not be granted until both reasonable and necessary.
parties have attended the mandatory course described in
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandSection 30-3-11.3, and have presented a certificate of
parents, and other members of the immediate family, the
course completion to the court. The court may waive this
court shall consider the best interest of the child.
requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for
the parties, if it determines course attendance and
peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an
completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in
order establishing a visitation schedule a provision,
the best interest of the parties.
among other things, authorizing any peace officer to
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under
before the court or the court commissioner as provided by
this chapter.
Section 78-3-31 and rules of the Judicial Council. The
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitacourt or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall enter tion provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court
the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees
after default of the respondent, upon the petitioner's expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court
affidavit.
determines that the petition was without merit and not
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by
asserted or defended against in good faith.
order of the court upon the motion of either party. The sealed
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a
portion of the file is available to the public only upon an order
visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or other member
of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of record or
of the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where
attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office
a visitation right has been previously granted by the court, the
of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied
court may award to the prevailing party costs, including
for or is receiving public assistance, or the court have full
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing
access to the entire record. This sealing does not apply to
party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise
subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree.
1997
court-ordered visitation.
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following fac30-3-4.1 t o 30-3-4.4. Repealed.
1990
tors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipi30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and
ent spouse;
health care of parties and children — Divi(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to
sion of debts — Court to have continuing
produce income;
jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — De(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide
termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious pesupport; and
tition for modification.
(iv) the length of the marriage.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property,
detennining alimony.
debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the
following in every decree of divorce:
standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (a).
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and
the dependent children;
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base ali(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable
mony on the standard of living that existed at the time of
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of
trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the
for the dependent children;
court may consider the standard of living that existed at
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
the time of the marriage.
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabili(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances,
attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of
ties of the parties contracted or incurred during
living.
marriage;
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ttatiparjent. Other, unearned income^otal child may be
considSgd^ai incdme,,to a* parent depending upon, the
circumstances of each case.A
1997
78-45-7.6, Adjusted gross income.
(1) As*\ised in the^guideunes, 'adjusted gross income* is the
amount calculated by subtracting from gross income alimony
previousIVrordered and "paid a n d child~suppbrt~ previously
ordered!!'
(2)-The guiaeiines do'not'reduce the* total child support
award by: adjusting the gross incomes" of the. parents' for
alimony ordered in the pendmg*proceeding.r In establishing
alimony, the court shall consider that in determining the child
support, the guidelines do not provide a deduction from gross
income for alimony.
1989
78-45-7.7/ Calculation of obligations.
_
(1) The parents' child support obligation shall be divided
between them in proportion to their adjusted gross incomes,
unless the low income table is applicable.
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and split
custody as defined in Section 78-45-2 and in cases"where the
obligors adjusted gross income is $1,050 or less monthly, the
base child support award shall be determined as follows:
(a) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents
and determine the base combined child support obligation
using the base combined child support obligation table.
(b) Calculate each parent's proportionate share of the
base combined child support obligation by multiplying the
combined child support obligation by each parent's percentage of combined adjusted gross income.
(3) In cases where the monthly adjusted gross income of the
obligor is between $650 and $1,050, the base child support
award shall be the lesser of the amount calculated in accordance with Subsection (2) and the amount calculated using
the low income table.
(4) The base combined child support obligation table provides combined child support obligations for up to six children.
For more than six children, additional amounts may be added
to the base child support obligation shown. Unless rebutted by
Subsection 78-45-7.2(3), the amount ordered shall not be less
than the amount which would be ordered for up to six
children.
(5) If the monthly adjusted gross income of the obligor is
$649 or less, the court or administrative agency shall determine the amount of the child support obligation on a case-bycase basis, but the base child support award shall not be less
than $20.
(6) The amount shown on the table is the support amount
for the total number of children, not an amount per child.
1994

78-45-7.8. Split custody — Obligation calculations.
In cases of split custody, the base child support award shall
be determined as follows:
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents
and determine the base combined child support obligation
using the base combined child support obligation table.
Allocate a portion of the calculated amount between the
parents in proportion to the number of children for whom
each parent has physical custody. The amounts so calculated are a tentative base child support obligation due
each parent from the other parent for support of the child
or children for whom each parent has physical custody.
(2) Multiply the tentative base child support obligation
due each parent by the percentage that the other parents
adjusted gross income bears to the total combined adjusted gross income of both parents.
(3) Subtract the lesser amount in Subsection (2) from
the larger amount to determine the base child support
award to be paid by the parent with the greater financial
obligation.
1994

54&

78-45-7.9.TT J o i n t p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y .
O b l i g a t i o n calculations.
In cases of joint physical custody, the base child support
award shall be determined'as follows:
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents
and determine the base combined child support obligation
using tHe base combined'child support obhgation tafifcT (2) Calculate'each parenfs'proportionate share of the
base combined child support obligation by multiplying the.
base combined[child support obligation by/each parent's
percentage of'combined* adjusted gross1 ^income,c The,
amounts so calculated are a tentative base child support
obligation^ due from eactf^parcmtffhr support of t h e children!
(3) Multiply each parent's tentative base child support
obligation by the percentage of time the children spend
with the other parent to determine each parent's tentative
obligation to the other parent.
(4) Calculate the base child support award to be paid
by the obligor by subtracting the lesser amount calculated
in Subsection (3) from the larger amount.
(5> The parent determined to be the obligor in Subsection (4) shalfpay the amount calculated in Subsection (4)
when the obligee has physical custody.
1994
78-45-7.10. Reduction when child becomes 18.
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age, or has graduated
from high school during the child's normal'and expected year
of graduation, whichever occurs later, the base child support
award is automatically reduced to reflect the lower base
combined child support obligation shown in the table for the
remaining number of children due child support, unless otherwise provided in the child support order.
(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child amount
derived from the base chi^d support award originally ordered.
1994

78-45-7.11. Reduction for extended visitation.
(1) The child support order shall provide that the base child
support award be reduced by 50% for each child for time
periods during which the child is with the noncustodial parent
by order of the court or by written agreement of the parties for
at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. If the dependent child
is a client of cash assistance provided under Title 35A,
Chapter 3, Part 3, Family Employment Program, any agreement by the parties for reduction of child support during
extended visitation shall be approved by the administrative
agency. However, normal visitation and holiday visits to the
custodial parent shall not be considered an ii .~erruption of the
consecutive day requirement.
(2) For purposes of this section the per child amount to
which the abatement applies shall be calculated by dividing
the base child support award by the number of children
included in the award.
1997
78-45-7.12. Income in excess of tables.
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the highest
level specified in the table, an appropriate and just child
support amount shall be ordered on a case-by-case basis, but
the amount ordered may not be less than the highest level
specified in the table for the number of children due support
1994

78-45-7.13. Advisory committee — Membership and
functions.
(1) On or before March 1,1995, the governor shall appoint
an advisory committee consisting of:
(a) one representative recommended by the Office of
Recovery Services;
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the court shall adjust the amount of child support ordered
to that which is provided for in the guidelines,
(j^ Notice of the on^ortunitv to adjust a svi^ort order
Yider Subsections 16> and H) shall l>e included in each child
^pport order issued or modified after July 1,1997.
1997
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y^-45-7.3. P r o c e d u r e — D o c u m e n t a t i o n — Stipulation.
' (1) In a default or uncontested proceeding, the moving
jurty shall submit:
*
(a) a completed child support worksheet;
(b) the financial verification required by Subsection
78-45-7.5(5); and
(c) a written statement indicating whether or not the
amount of child support requested is consistent with the
guidelines.
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required under Subsection (1) is not available, a verified representation of the
defaulting party's income by the moving party, based on
the best evidence available, may be submitted.
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and may only
be offered after a copy has been provided to the defaulting
party in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in
an administrative proceeding.
(3) (a) In a stipulated proceeding, one of the moving parties
shall submit:
(i) a completed child support worksheet;
(ii) the financial verification required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and
Vm> a written statement lnoicating whether or not
the amount of child support requested is consistent
with the guidelines.
(b) A hearing is not required, but the guidelines shall
be used to review the adequacy of a child support order
negotiated by the parents.
(c) A stipalated amount for child support or combined
child support and alimony is adequate under the guidelines if the stipulated child support amount or combined
amount equals or exceeds the base child support award
required by the guidelines.
1994
7&~45-7.4. O b l i g a t i o n — A d j u s t e d g r o s s i n c o m e u s e d .
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each
parent's share of the base combined child support obligation.
Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of the child
jjjay be used to determine the award under these guidelines.
1994

<7#-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed
income.
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including
nonearned. sources, except under Subsection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends,
from previous marriages/annuities, capital gains, social
security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment compensation, disability insurance benefits,
and payments from "nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources Tis limited to the
equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job. However, if and only if
during the time prior to the original support order, the parent
normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at his
job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: o
* '*$*{*) cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter
3, Part 3, Family Employment Program;' >c
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(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program,
the Job Training Partnership Act, Supplemental Security
Income, Social Security Disability Insurance, Medicaid,
Tood Stamps, or tjeneral Assistance; ana
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of
a busmess shall be calculated by subtracting necessary
expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses from
self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income
available to the parent to satisfy a child support award.
Only those expenses necessary to allow the business to
operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross
receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection
may differ from the amount of business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current
income. Each parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs
or employer statements and complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the court
finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of mcome from records maintained by the Departstubs, employer statements, and income tax returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to
determine whether an underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent
tender Subsection (7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the
parent stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing is
held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be
based upon employment potential and probable earnings
as derived from work history, occupation qualifications,
and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall
be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a
40-hour work week. To impute a greater income, the judge
in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an
administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of
fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following
conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children approach or equal the amount of
income the custodial parent can earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to
the extent he cannot earn minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational
training to establish basic job skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child
require the custodial parent's presence in the home,
(a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child
ho is the subject of a child support award nor benefits to
a child in the child's own right such as Supplemental
Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to
ine earnings of a parent shall be credited as child support
to the parent upon whose earning record ii is based, by
Crediting the amount against the potential obligation of
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